Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage by Cohen, Daniel A. et al.
 Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to 
Arbitrage* 
 
 
 
Daniel A. Cohen 
 
Leventhal School of Accounting 
Marshall School of Business 
University of Southern California 
Los Angeles, CA 90089 
 
Aiyesha Dey 
 
Thomas Z. Lys** 
 
Shyam V. Sunder 
 
Kellogg School of Management 
Northwestern University 
Evanston, Illinois 60208 
 
 
December 27, 2004 
 
 
* A previous version of this paper was entitled: Blinded by the Light:  
Are Earnings Announcements worth the Risk?  We would like to thank Yonca Ertimur, Tom Fields, 
Emre Karaoglu, Margaret A. Neale, Doug Skinner (the editor), Linda Vincent, an anonymous referee 
and seminar participants at the 2004 meeting of the American Accounting Association, the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the University of Illinois at Chicago, and the Zell Brown Bag 
Seminar Series at the Kellogg School for helpful comments on previous drafts.  Financial support from 
the Zell Center for Risk Research at the Kellogg School is gratefully acknowledged.  All remaining 
errors are our own responsibility. 
 **  Corresponding Author (847) 491-2673, tlys@kellogg.northwestern.edu 
 1
Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage 
 
Abstract 
 
We document that earnings announcement-day premia persist beyond the sample period 
of earlier studies, over different disclosure environments and remain robust to the 
refinement of using the expected announcement day rather than the actual announcement 
day.  A portfolio of announcing firms yields returns in excess of the corresponding risk.  
Excluding announcers from a well-diversified portfolio, while reducing the standard 
deviation of that portfolio, also reduces its Sharpe ratio, indicating that this strategy 
results in a less favorable risk-return trade-off.  Finally, we provide evidence that the 
premia are dramatically reduced when the announcement risk is reduced through pre-
announcements.  In addition, we document that the continued presence of this premia is 
likely to result from limits to arbitrage.  These findings are consistent with the view that 
the announcement period returns are likely to represent compensation for announcement 
risk.   
 
1. Introduction 
Prior literature has documented the existence of abnormal returns around predictable 
news announcements (Penman, 1984; Kalay and Lowenstein, 1985; Chari, Jagannathan 
and Ofer, 1988), and these abnormal returns remain after controlling for the increase in 
systematic risk in the announcement window (Ball and Kothari, 1991).  Assuming 
investor rationality and mean-variance pricing, investors would require announcement 
premia when: (1) the announcement day is known in advance or is predictable, and (2) 
the risk is non-diversifiable after taking into account the increase in risk resulting from 
the announcement.1   
                                         
1 Robicheck and Myers (1966) illustrate this phenomenon with the following story:  A ship sets out on a 
two-year voyage in search of gold.  At its departure, the prices of all financial claims on the payoffs of this 
journey reflect all the available information.  Suppose no information reaches the market while the ship is 
away.  Until the point the ship reaches the port, expected return on all financial claims related to the payoffs 
from the journey will be free of additional risk, because there is no information that would lead investors to 
change their valuations.  Hence, during the voyage, the investment should earn the risk-free rate.  However, 
the uncertainty is resolved once the ship returns with cargo.  Therefore, if the risk were not diversifiable, 
the expected return would be higher on the day the market receives information about the claims’ likely 
payoff. 
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On the surface it would appear that the announcement risk should be diversifiable and 
not reflected in higher returns.  For example, Fama (1986) documents that the risk of a 
portfolio converges rapidly towards that of a fully diversified portfolio as the number of 
securities increases, and that the number of securities necessary to achieve diversification 
is relatively small, typically less than 30.  Thus, announcement risk should be 
diversifiable, given that (i) relatively few securities announce earnings on a given day, 
(ii) the number of securities traded on US stock exchanges exceeds 7000, and thus 
announcers would make up a miniscule fraction of a well-diversified portfolio, and (iii) 
we find relatively little industry clustering of earnings announcement days.2  Jointly, 
these factors suggest that the announcement risk should be diversifiable and reinforces 
the idea that the presence of continuing announcement premia is a puzzle. 
The purpose of this paper is three-fold. First, we extend the prior literature on the 
announcement risk premium by examining the existence of the announcement premium 
over time, after controlling for the timing of the announcements (whether the 
announcements were early, on-time, or late), and the changes in the disclosure 
environment (by controlling for pre-announcements made by firms). Second, we examine 
the risk-return tradeoff investors face in light of the non-diversifiability (or the lack 
thereof) of announcement risk.  Finally, we test whether the limits to arbitrage explain the 
continued existence of the announcement premium.    
Consistent with prior research, we find a significant announcement premium when we 
use the firm’s non-announcement period returns as well as when we use non-announcing 
firms’ returns in the announcement period as benchmarks.  Specifically, the average 
                                         
2 For example, within a two-digit SIC industry classifications, we find on average only 5 firms announcing 
on the same day. 
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return in the expected announcement period (days -1, 0, and +1 relative to the expected 
earnings announcement day) for firms that announced on time or later than the expected 
date, is about 0.05 percent when the firm is used as its own control, and 0.01 percent 
when the returns of non-announcers in the announcement period of a firm is used as a 
control.   
The presence of this announcement premium is significant for several reasons.  First, 
it establishes the continued existence of a premium in spite of published research 
identifying this profit opportunity, the latest of which was published by Ball and Kothari 
in 1991.3  Second, we use the expected announcement date rather than the actual 
announcements dates used in prior literature to document the announcement premium.  
Therefore, our results do not suffer from a selection bias arising from timing of the 
earnings announcements – early, late or on-time announcements.   Third, we investigate 
the announcement premium for a subset of firms that issued earnings pre-announcements 
– thus effectively reducing (or even eliminating) the earnings announcement risk.  We 
find that pre-announcements eliminate the announcement premium.  Thus, this result is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the increased return on earnings announcement dates 
is indeed related to announcement risk.   
Turning to the question of whether the announcement premium compensates for the 
increased risk, we find that portfolios comprising announcer firms earn a significant 
excess return (Jensen’s alpha) of between 0.038 percent and 0.053 percent per day.  
Further, we show that excluding announcing firms from an otherwise fully diversified 
portfolio results in a decline of the average portfolio standard deviation by 3.1 percent but 
                                         
3 The sample period of Ball and Kothari (1991) ended in the first quarter of 1988.  
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results in lower Sharpe ratios.  Thus excluding announcing firms results in a less 
favorable return-risk tradeoff.4  Jointly, these results lead us to the conclusion that 
earnings announcements returns are “worth” the risk. 
In considering why these premia persist, our evidence indicates that limits to arbitrage 
prevent the announcement period abnormal returns from being arbitraged away.  
Specifically, we find that the premium is positively associated with the costs of arbitrage, 
including idiosyncratic risk and the bid-ask spread.  We find weak evidence supporting a 
negative association between the premium and the float on announcement days – 
consistent with arbitrage being more likely when a sufficient number of shares are 
available for trading.  We also find that the premium is higher on days when greater 
concentrations of firms announce their earnings – consistent with the hypothesis that 
arbitrage capital is limited.  Finally, our results indicate a negative association between 
the announcement premia and the trading volume on announcement days.  We interpret 
this result as supportive of the hypothesis that when arbitrage activity is high, premia are 
low.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview 
of the related literature and Section 3 discusses the research questions.  Section 4 
describes the data used in the analysis. Section 5 contains a detailed analysis of the 
announcement premia.  Specifically, in this section we analyze the magnitude of the 
announcement premia after controlling for the timing of the announcements, the effect of 
the changing disclosure environment on the announcement premia, and the persistence 
over time of the announcement premia.  Section 6 presents an analysis of whether 
                                         
4 Also, the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio of announcing firms exceeds the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio of 
non-announcing firms once sufficient diversification is present in the announcer portfolios.   
 5
earnings announcements are worth the risk, and Section 7 explores limits to arbitrage as 
an explanation for the continued existence of the announcement premia. Finally, Section 
8 concludes. 
 
2.  Related Research 
Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1987) and Ball and Kothari (1991) document that 
unconditional on the earnings information, returns on earnings announcement days are 
higher than on non-earnings announcement days. A similar effect for dividend 
announcement days has been documented by Kalay and Loewenstein (1985).   
According to Ball and Kothari (1991), while scheduled earnings announcements 
resolve some uncertainty about future cash flows (the “uncertainty resolution 
hypothesis”), the increased flow of information also increases the variability of returns 
during these announcements.  They hypothesize that the arrival of new information 
causes the systematic risk (beta) to increase leading to the observed higher expected 
returns during the earnings announcement period.  Therefore, announcing firms will have 
higher return variances, betas and expected returns.  In their empirical tests, they find 
significant abnormal returns (0.066 and 0.078 percent on days -1 and 0 respectively, 
where day 0 represents the actual earnings announcement day).  Ball and Kothari find 
that a significant portion of announcement period abnormal returns remains unexplained 
even after they control for the increase in the β-risk during earnings announcement 
periods.  The presence of these abnormal returns is a puzzle, but Ball and Kothari do not 
investigate potential explanations for this puzzle beyond documenting that the abnormal 
returns are negatively correlated with firm size.  However, the use of actual 
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announcement dates complicates the interpretation of the results.  The reason is that a 
significant fraction of firms announce earnings prior to their “expected” announcement 
date.  As a result, these announcements are unanticipated and, as a result, there should be 
no announcement risk premia on those dates.  Moreover, Chambers and Penman (1984) 
document that early announcers tend to be firms with good news, while late announcers 
tend to be firms with bad news.  Thus, Ball and Kothari combine announcement premia 
and the response to the news contained in early and late announcements, complicating the 
interpretation of their results.   
A few empirical studies have documented results that conflict with the presence of an 
earnings announcement-day premium.  Peterson (1990) finds that the seasonal patterns of 
returns for firms reporting earnings on a given day are not stronger than those for firms 
not announcing earnings on a given day.  Brown and Kim (1993) provide evidence 
suggesting that earnings announcements of small firms are associated with positive 
abnormal returns due to concurrent non-earnings announcements made by these firms, 
not to the earnings announcements of small firms’ per se.     
In summary, while the preponderance of evidence supporting the presence of higher 
returns on predictable disclosure events suggests that investors require an announcement-
day premium, this finding is not without controversy.  Specifically, given the large 
number of firms, it is hard to imagine that opportunities for diversification of this risk 
would not eliminate, or at least mitigate, any need for an announcement-day premium.   
One alternative reason for abnormal returns around earnings announcements 
identified by prior research is attributed to the signal value of the timing of the 
announcements.  For example, Chambers and Penman (1984) find negative abnormal 
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returns on annual report announcement dates that are unexpectedly late.  This finding is 
interpreted as an indication that investors interpret the failure to report on time as a 
forecast of bad news.  McNichols (1988) finds that return distributions are more 
negatively skewed on earnings announcement dates than during non-announcement 
periods.  One explanation for this result provided by McNichols is that more extreme bad 
news is disclosed by mandatory earnings reports than by other discretionary information 
sources.  This conjecture is supported by studies such as Patell (1976), Penman (1980) 
and Waymire (1984), which show that management earnings forecasts are more 
optimistic than analysts’ earnings forecasts.  Lev and Penman (1990) also document 
evidence of a ‘screening motive’ among firms where earnings forecasts are used by firms 
with ‘good news’ to screen themselves out from other firms.  In contrast, Skinner (1994, 
1997), Kaznik and Lev (1995) and Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther (2000) argue that 
bad news firms announce early to mitigate litigation risk.  Begley and Fischer (1998) 
assess the relation between earnings news and earnings announcement timing in the 
period 1983-1992.  They find that while early announcements are associated with good 
news relative to late announcements over the sample years, the relationship is not strictly 
monotonic.  
One explanation for the persistent announcement premium effect found in the 
literature may be attributed to the limits to arbitrage.  According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), the effect of arbitrage is to bring security prices to their fundamental values and 
make markets efficient.  According to Scholes (1972), the arbitrageur would buy (sell) an 
under (over) priced stock and simultaneously short (long) a perfect substitute.  In theory 
arbitrage requires no capital and is essentially risk free since the arbitrageur buys the 
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cheaper security and sells the expensive one, his net future cash flows are zero for sure 
and he makes all his profits upfront.  However there are two major barriers to execution 
of costless arbitrage in practice.  First, as Mashruwala, Rajagopal and Shevlin (2004) 
point out that for a riskless hedge to exist, the arbitrageur needs to find close substitute 
stocks whose returns are highly correlated with the returns of the firms subject to 
anomalous mispricing. However, identifying such substitutes is a difficult task in 
practice.  In their study, they find that the well documented “accruals anomaly” is 
persistent since it is difficult to arbitrage.  Secondly, as Shliefer and Vishny (1997) point 
out, frictions and risks in execution of the arbitrage in practice results in “risk arbitrage” 
that requires substantial commitment of capital on part of arbitrageurs.  In turn, 
arbitrageurs may have capital constraints or may be forced to raise capital from investors 
who may not have the required appetite to sustain risk positions. These factors deter 
arbitrage activities and can lead to persistent anomalous returns in the market. 
   
3. Research Questions 
Our first research objective is to extend prior research on identifying the conditions 
under which an announcement risk premium exists.  The sample period of the most 
recent research on announcement-risk premia (Ball and Kothari, 1991) ends in the first 
quarter of 1988.  However, significant changes in the information environment occurred 
since the late 1980s.  Specifically, there has been an increase in voluntary disclosures 
outside the required periodic disclosures, such as earnings pre-announcements.  Because 
pre-announcements reduce the announcement risk and are likely to reduce earnings 
announcement premia, we expect pre-announcing firms to have a smaller announcement 
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period return.  Thus, the occurrence of pre-announcements provides a natural experiment 
in which to test whether the increased return on earnings announcement dates relate to 
earnings-announcement risk.       
In addition to pre-announcements, we also examine the effect on announcement 
premia of the information content of earnings announcements, relative to all other 
sources of information.   Specifically, we investigate whether periods with a large 
number of other information releases are associated with higher or lower announcement-
period premia.  
 Several aspects of the existing research on the announcement-day premium present 
opportunities for further analysis and modifications.  First, prior studies documenting the 
announcement-day premium use the actual announcement dates rather than the expected 
announcement dates (Chari et al, 1987, Ball and Kothari, 1991).  However, one 
precondition for an announcement premium to exist is that the announcement date is 
known in advance or is predictable.  We refine the analysis of the earnings announcement 
premium by controlling for the timing of the announcements. 
The presence of a continued and robust earnings announcement premium leads to our 
next research question: how much risk do earnings announcements add to the risk of a 
well diversified portfolio?  We study whether the increased risk on earnings 
announcement days is justified by increased return on those days.  To answer this 
question we examine how much excess returns can be earned by adding announcing 
firms to a portfolio of non-announcing firms.  
Finally, we investigate why the announcement premia are not eliminated by arbitrage.  
We explore this issue by considering whether limits to arbitrage can explain the 
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continued existence of the announcement day premium.  Specifically, we explore 
whether idiosyncratic risk, bid-ask spreads, float (average trading volume scaled by the 
average number of shares outstanding), trading volume, and concentration of announcing 
firms is related to the earnings announcement premium.   
Arbitraging announcement risk requires undiversified positions.  As a result, arbitrage 
portfolios will be more risky for firms with greater idiosyncratic risk.  Therefore, 
arbitrageurs are likely to take smaller positions in firms with high idiosyncratic risk, 
resulting in higher announcement-period premia for those firms.   
Bid-ask spreads reflect a large portion of the round-trip transaction costs associated 
with arbitrage and we expect the (un-arbitraged) announcement premia to increase in the 
bid-ask spread.  Float measures the number of shares available in the market place.  The 
higher the float, the easier it is for arbitrageurs to assume and unwind their positions.  
Trading volume measures the impact of arbitrageurs’ trading market prices and we expect 
a negative relation between trading volume and announcement risk premia.  This is in 
contrast to Beaver’s (1968) hypothesis – where volume is a measure of the arrival of 
information, thus implying a positive relation between volume and announcement period 
return.   
Finally, since arbitrage capital is likely to be limited, the greater the concentration of 
firms announcing on a given date the higher the un-arbitraged announcement-risk 
premium.  Evidence supporting the limits to arbitrage theory also implies that the 
announcement risk premia is likely to persist.      
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4. Data 
Table 1 describes the sample selection criteria.  Quarterly earnings announcement 
dates are collected from the COMPUSTAT quarterly file for the period 1978 to 2001 to 
yield a maximum of 96 quarters for each of the sample firms.  We collect all firms with a 
December fiscal year and available quarterly earnings announcement dates on 
COMPUSTAT, resulting in 12,377 firms and 297,426 firm-quarter observations.  We 
only retain firms with at least 10 firm-quarter observations, resulting in 8,493 firms and 
275,820 firm-quarter observations.   Finally, after merging the COMPUSTAT sample 
with CRSP daily files, we retain 7,260 firms and 227,281 firm-quarters.    
We collect earnings announcement dates from COMPUSTAT.  As per 
COMPUSTAT, this date corresponds to “The date in which quarterly earnings and 
earnings per share figures are first publicly reported in the various news media (such as 
the Wall Street Journal or newswire services).”5  As a result, the information may have 
been impounded into security prices on day -1 or 0 for events where the announcement 
date is from the news media and on day 0 or +1 when the earliest date is from newswire 
services.  Therefore, we define the earnings announcement period as the three days 
centered on the COMPUSTAT earnings announcement date (days -1, 0, and +1).   
For our analyses on the effect of the disclosure environment on the announcement 
premium, we gather data on pre-announcements of quarterly earnings.  The pre-
announcement data is obtained from the Company Issued Guidance (CIG) database 
maintained by First Call.  First Call gathers data about earnings pre-announcements from 
                                         
5 Ball and Bartov (1995) state that COMPUSTAT relies on data sources such as, the Wall Street Journal, 
for earnings dates. However they suggest that the errors may be “small in number”.  
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press releases and interviews by company officials.6  An analysis of the database shows 
that the data is available on a widespread basis from 1998, although First Call claims to 
have data going back to 1990.  We restrict our pre-announcements sample to observations 
over the period 1998 to 2001 because the data for prior periods is less complete.  This 
sample selection yields 70,073 firm-quarter observations for 5,178 firms.   Of these, 
46,184 firm quarters representing 5,121 firms had pre-announcements. 
 
5. Analysis of the Announcement Risk Premia 
Prior literature (Chari and Jagannathan, 1987; Ball and Kothari, 1991) has 
documented the existence of earnings announcement premia using the actual earnings 
announcement date.  However, their approach suffers from ex-post conditioning of the 
event date.  Using actual dates adds noise to the measurement of the premia because the 
timing of the announcement per se may convey information.  For example, good news 
firms may announce early, while bad news firms may announce late (Penman, 1987; 
McNichols, 1988).  We begin the empirical analysis by investigating the magnitude of 
the earnings announcement premia as a function of the timing of announcements, i.e., we 
first examine the abnormal returns for early, on-time and late announcers.  
 
5.1 Premia Relative to the Timing of Announcements 
We estimate the expected earnings announcement date for each firm in each quarter 
using the procedure described in Appendix I.  Briefly, we estimate a firm-specific model 
to estimate the expected announcement date.  Using this procedure, we classify firm-
                                         
6 Other studies that have used the database are Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther (2000) and Cotter, Tuna 
and Wysocki (2002). 
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quarters as early announcements, on-time announcements, and late announcements.  On-
time announcements are those which occurred in the expected announcement periods 
(consisting of the three-day period centered on the expected announcement date).7  Late 
announcements are those which occurred subsequent to the expected announcement 
periods and early announcements are those which occurred prior to the expected earnings 
announcement periods.   
We form portfolios of each group of firms and compute the returns over two periods: 
the expected earnings announcement day (day 0) and the expected earnings 
announcement period (days -1, 0 and +1).  We obtain similar results for the one-day 
announcement periods as for the three-day announcement periods and, for brevity, we 
only report and discuss the results for the three-day announcement periods. 
To investigate the existence and the magnitude of the earnings announcement premia, 
we use two benchmarks.  First, for each firm j and quarter q we subtract the mean return 
in non-announcement periods.  This first benchmark uses the firm as its own control.  
Since there is a significant clustering of announcement dates in calendar time, we also 
use the returns on all non-announcing firms on the announcer’s date as a second control: 
for each announcement in period t and quarter q, we compute the mean daily return for 
firms that did not announce.  While our major results are invariant to the specific 
benchmark, the following trade-off exists.  Using the firm as its own control (the first 
benchmark) has the advantage that it is likely to provide a better control for risk to the 
extent that firms within an industry may announce in close proximity (and hence the non-
announcer portfolio is likely to consists of firms from other industries).  However, the 
                                         
7 As a sensitivity check, our results remain qualitatively unchanged when we define on-time 
announcements as those occurring on the expected announcements date (as opposed to the three-day 
window centered on the expected announcement date). 
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second benchmark (using non-announcing firms as a benchmark) controls for market 
movements.   
Table 2 reports the announcement premium relative to the two benchmarks.  For the 
entire sample, on expected announcement periods we find an announcement premium of 
0.05 percent (t = 2.99) using the firm as its own benchmark and 0.01 percent (t = 3.11) 
using non-announcers as a benchmark.    
Firms announcing prior to the expected date (that is the actual announcement 
occurred prior to the expected announcement period) earned a premium on the expected 
announcement date using the firm as its own benchmark (abnormal return 0.05 percent, t 
= 2.49).  Although the magnitude is small, this result is a bit surprising, since these firms 
have already announced, we should not observe any abnormal return on the expected 
announcement date. However, the magnitude of the excess return on the expected 
announcement date is not significant when we use non-announcing firms as the 
benchmark (-0.00 percent, t = -0.93).   
On the actual announcement date, we find that early announcers had an 
announcement premia of 0.29 percent (t = 15.18) relative to their non-announcement 
returns, and 0.14 percent (t = 14.73) relative to non-announcing firms in the same period.  
Overall, these results are consistent with our expectations, since prior research has shown 
that firms announcing early tend to have good news (Chambers and Penman, 1984; 
McNichols, 1988).  Firms announcing on time have an announcement premia of 0.13 
percent (t = 5.49) relative to their non-announcement returns, and 0.02 percent (t = 2.87) 
relative to the return of other firms that did not announce in that window.8   
                                         
8 Note that the expected and actual announcement dates are identical for firms announcing on time. 
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Late announcing firms have a negative, but insignificant, announcement premia both 
relative to their own non-announcement returns (-0.00 percent, t = -0.31) and relative to 
the returns of non-announcing firms (-0.00 percent, t = -0.29) in the expected 
announcement window.  In their actual announcement window, late announcers have 
insignificant negative announcement premia relative to their non-announcement return 
(-0.00, t = -0.94) and a significantly negative announcement premia relative to non-
announcing firms (-0.00, t = -6.42).  
To analyze the magnitude of the earnings announcement risk premia, we combine on-
time and late announcing firms.  The reason for this is to avoid a selection bias, as late 
announcing firms cannot be identified ex-ante.  In the expected announcement windows, 
the combined sample of on-time and late announcers have an announcement premia of 
0.052 percent (t = 4.37) relative to their non-announcement returns, and 0.008 percent (t 
= 5.14) relative to the return of non-announcing firms.  The corresponding numbers for 
the actual announcement windows are 0.052 percent (t = 2.53) and 0.008 percent (t = 
4.20) respectively.  
To summarize, for the expected announcement periods, we find positive premia when 
firms announce on time, zero abnormal returns when they announce early (except when 
we use the firm as its own benchmark), and negative abnormal returns when they 
announce late (although the latter results are not statistically significant).  For the actual 
announcement periods, we find positive returns for early announcers and negative returns 
for late announcers (except when we use the firm as its benchmark).  Thus, these results 
are generally consistent with both the announcement risk hypothesis and the Chambers-
Penman hypothesis.   
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Our announcement premia are generally consistent with results reported in much of 
the literature.  For instance, Beaver (1968) finds that for 143 firms during 1961-1965, the 
average risk-premium in the annual earnings announcement week was around 4 times the 
average rate of return in other weeks.  For the 1976-1984 period, Chari, Jagannathan and 
Ofer (1987) document that for the smallest 10% of the sample firms, 16% of the average 
annual return occurs on the 8 days in a year corresponding to the two-day windows 
surrounding the four quarterly earnings announcement days.9   
However, our results also indicate that the announcement premia documented in prior 
research (relying on the actual as opposed to the expected announcement periods) are 
overstated, as the Chambers-Penman effect (good news firms announce early, bad news 
firms announce late) is larger for early announcers than for late announcers.  Specifically, 
the premia for the entire portfolio is much higher when computed for the actual 
announcement periods as compared to the expected announcement periods (0.014 percent 
compared to 0.05 percent when the firm is used as its own benchmark, and 0.06 percent 
compared to 0.01 percent when non-announcers are used as a benchmark, respectively). 
As expected, a large component of the premia on the actual announcement period is 
contributed by the early announcers (0.29 percent when the firm is used as its own 
benchmark and 0.14 percent when non-announcers are used as a benchmark 
respectively).   
The above evidence underscores the importance of using expected versus actual 
announcement periods while testing for the announcement premia. To address this issue, 
we conduct our subsequent tests on announcement premia for two subsamples: the 
                                         
9 In a closely related research, Kalay and Loewenstein (1985) show that an equally-weighted portfolio of all 
dividend announcements made by 302 firms during July 1962 through December 1980 yields excess 
returns of 0.4% over the four day event period commencing on the dividend announcement day. 
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sample of on-time announcers only, i.e., those firms whose actual announcement periods 
coincided with their expected announcement periods, and the sample of on-time and late 
announcers only, i.e., those firms whose actual announcement periods either coincided 
with or were after their expected announcement periods.   
Overall, even after controlling for the timing of announcements, we find compelling 
evidence for the existence of an announcement risk premium.  Our next goal is to 
investigate the effect of the changing disclosure environment on the announcement risk 
premia. Specifically, we provide two tests of the impact of changes in the disclosure 
environment on the earnings announcement premia: we analyze the effect of earnings 
pre-announcements, and the information content of earnings announcements on the 
announcement premia.  This evidence is presented next.  
 
5.2 The Effect of Changing Disclosure Environment on Announcement Risk Premia 
As indicated above, the disclosure environment has changed significantly over the 
sample period.  One of the significant changes has been the increased tendency of firms 
to make earnings pre-announcements.  In the presence of pre-announcements we would 
expect to see a reduction in the earnings announcement premia since the news is no 
longer a complete surprise.  In other words, if the return documented in Table 2 is an 
announcement-risk premium, then that premium should be lower (or absent) for firms 
that pre-announced earnings (as there is reduced or no disclosure risk left).  We begin by 
investigating whether pre-announcements result in lower earnings announcement premia.  
We also analyze whether the announcement period premia are related to changes in the 
information content of earnings, relative to all other sources of information. 
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 To analyze the effect of pre-announcements on the announcement premia, we gather 
data in the date of pre-announcements from First Call for the period 1998 through 2001.  
The results are reported in Table 3A.  We first analyze the announcement period returns 
for on-time and late announcing firms in the 1998-2001 period (Row 1): For firms that 
issued pre-announcements, the announcement period premium is 0.06 percent (t = 2.48) 
using the firm as its own benchmark and 0.05 percent (t = 2.38) relative to non-
announcing firms.  In contrast, the returns are 0.14 percent (t = 4.08) and 0.11 percent (t 
= 3.53) for firms that did not issue pre-announcements in the same period.  Row 3 reports 
that the differences between rows 1 and 2 are statistically significant at conventional 
levels (t = -3.54 and t = -2.50, respectively).   
 Next we investigate whether the differences between pre-announcing and non-pre-
announcing firms are due to firm-specific differences by analyzing the announcement 
period returns in 1978-1997 for firms that pre-announced earnings in 1998-2001 (when 
these firms are not likely to have pre-announced earnings).  As reported in Row 4 of 
Table 3A, the announcement period return in 1978-1997 for those firms that did pre-
announce in 1998-2001 are 0.54 percent (t = 4.57) using the firm as its own benchmark 
and 0.14 percent (t = 4.02) relative to non-announcing firms.  The announcement period 
returns in 1978-1997 for firms that did not pre-announce earnings in the 1998-2001 are 
0.56 (t = 4.96) and 0.16 (t = 3.52), respectively (Row 5).  However, as reported in Row 6 
of Table 3A, the difference across these two portfolios is not statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  Thus, we find no evidence that the lower announcement period 
return of pre-announcing firms is due to firm-specific characteristics. 
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 Jointly, these results reported in Table 3A imply that pre-announcements reduce the 
announcement-period returns.  Since pre-announcements are likely to reduce the earnings 
announcement risk, we interpret these results as being consistent with the presence of an 
announcement period premium.   
 However, managers may have decided to pre-announce in response to greater 
information leakage. We address this issue next by investigating whether the impact of 
pre-announcements on announcement period returns is significant after controlling for the 
differences in the amount of information that was available prior to the earnings 
announcements.   
There exists at least one alternative explanation for the results reported in Table 3A.  
Specifically, the changing informativeness of earnings announcements, relative to other 
sources of information may account for the varying announcement premium over time.  
To further explore this hypothesis, we compute a metric which we term the Relative 
Information Content (RIC), which captures the informativeness of the earnings 
announcements across firms over and over time.  Relying on Beaver (1968), we define 
RIC as the volatility of stock returns in the announcement periods relative to the volatility 
in non-announcement periods.10  Specifically, for each firm-quarter we define the relative 
information content of an announcement (RICjq) as the ratio of the sum of squares of 
returns in the announcement period relative to the sum of squares of returns in the entire 
quarter, or:  
                                         
10 The measure we use focuses on the relative, rather than the absolute, informativeness of financial 
disclosures.  See Brown, Lo and Lys (1999) for a discussion of whether financial statements became more 
informative over time. 
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where for firm j and quarter q, Aj represents the three day announcement period and qj 
represents the entire quarter, commencing on day +2 relative to the q-1 earnings 
announcement and ending on day +1 of quarter q’s earnings announcement.  Since the 
number of days between quarterly announcements varies, we normalize (1) by dividing 
the denominator by the actual number of days and multiplying by 63 (the average number 
of trading days in a quarter).   
 We perform two tests to investigate whether changes in the relative information 
content of earnings is related to the announcement period premia.  First, we divide the 
sample into three groups based on RIC and compare the difference in premia between the 
high and low RIC portfolios.  The results (untabulated) indicate that the premia are 
significantly higher for the high RIC portfolio, both when we use the firm as its own 
control (t = 28.14) and when we use non-announcing firms as the benchmark (t = 28.16). 
Second, we compute the correlation between RIC and the announcement period premia, 
and obtain positive and significant (at the 1 percent level) correlations for both 
benchmarks. These results support the claim that the higher the information content of 
earnings announcements relative to all other sources of information (i.e., the higher the 
risk associated with the announcements), the higher will be the announcement premia.  
 To provide a more formal analysis of the impact of the disclosure environment on the 
announcement premia, we estimate the following regression to measure the effect of pre-
announcements and the informativeness of earnings on the earnings announcement 
premia:  
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 jqjqjqjqjq RICdreAnnPcRMbaAP ε+×+×+×+=  (2) 
where for security j and quarter q, APjq represents the announcement premium (measured 
with respect to the two benchmarks); RMjq is the value-weighted CRSP return on the 
market on the announcement period (thus the coefficient b measures the extent to which 
the announcement day premium reflects beta risk); PreAnnjq is a dummy variable that 
equal 1 if a company made a pre-announcement in that quarter, and 0 otherwise; and 
RICjq is the relative informativeness measure.  We expect a negative association between 
PreAnnjq and APjq, and a positive association between RICjq and APjq.  
Table 3B summarizes the results of regression (2).11  Column (1) reports the results 
when the announcement premium is measured using the firm’s own returns on non-
announcement dates as a benchmark, and Column (2) reports the results when the 
announcement premium is measured using non-announcing firms’ returns on 
announcement dates as a benchmark.12   
The results of the multivariate analysis are consistent with the univariate results.  We 
find that for both the benchmarks, the coefficient estimate corresponding to PreAnnjq is 
negative and significant (-2.16, t = -5.51 and -2.98, t = -2.50, respectively) suggesting 
that the announcement risk premium is lower for firms that pre-announced their 
earnings.13  Similarly, for both benchmarks, the coefficient estimate corresponding to 
                                         
11 Our sample has only minimal time-series clustering, with the mean, median, and maximum number of 
firms announcing on a given day being 0.75%, 0.45%, and 6.47% respectively.  This suggests that the 
regression standard errors are unlikely to be understated due to cross-sectional dependence.  Nevertheless 
we re-estimate all regressions using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach.  As expected, none of our 
conclusions are changed, with only the significance of Float in Table 6A and 6B for the total sample 
dropping from significant at the 1% level to significant at the 5% level. 
12 As mentioned earlier, we conduct the tests both for the sample of on-time announcers, and for the sample 
of on-time and late announcers. The results for both these are similar and we only report the results for the 
latter sample.    
13 Consistent with the univariate results, the PreAnn dummy variables have the same order of magnitude as 
the intercepts, indicating that the announcement premium is actually zero for pre-announcing firms. 
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RICjq is positive and significant (7.77, t = 23.92 and 6.18, t = 15.19, respectively) 
supporting the argument that greater is the information content in the earnings 
announcements, higher is the announcement risk premia.14  Finally, the market 
coefficient b is positive and highly significant both in Columns (1) and (2) suggesting 
that earnings announcements have a higher systematic risk than nonannouncement 
periods. 
In summary, our analysis indicates that the earnings announcement premia are 
significantly lower for firms that pre-announce earnings, and are significantly higher for 
firms with more informative earnings announcements.  Given that the disclosure 
environment has changed over the time period examined, we expect the premia to have 
changed over time accordingly.  We present the analysis of the trend in the 
announcement premia next.  
 
5.3 Persistence of Announcement Premia 
 We investigate whether the premia documented in Table 2 persisted over time by 
regressing the premia on a time trend and a constant (results not tabulated).  The constant 
is 0.05 percent (t = 9.13) and the slope is 0.00007 (t = 7.87).  These results indicate that 
the average premium has been increasing over the sample period.  The result is somewhat 
surprising given the fact that the disclosure environment for firms has been improving 
over the years.  Thus, despite the increases in disclosures, there has been also an increase 
                                         
14 In order to ensure that the above results are not being driven by unobservable characteristics of firms that 
pre-announce in this period but are a function of the pre-announcement, we repeat the analysis for the 
period prior to 1998, and include a dummy variable for the firms that pre-announced in the 1998-2001 
period.  In unreported results we find that the dummy variable is not significant, which provides greater 
confidence in the above results. 
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in the premia over time.  This implies that there exist other, as yet unexplained, 
components that contributed to persistence of and increase in the earnings announcement 
premia.   
Having established the continued existence of significantly higher returns on earnings 
announcement dates, in the following section we focus on the question:  how much risk 
do earnings announcements add to the risk of a well-diversified portfolio?  
 
6.  Risk-Return Trade-Off: Are Earnings Announcements Worth the Risk? 
To investigate the risk-return trade-off of earnings announcements, we compute the 
daily returns on three value-weighted portfolios.  As before, we focus only on the on-time 
and late announcers.  The first portfolio consists of all sample firms with available data.  
For each trading day, the second portfolio includes only firms for which the particular 
announcement day does not fall within their quarterly earnings announcement window 
(days -1, 0, and +1 relative to the earnings announcement).  The third portfolio consists 
exclusively of announcing firms for the three-day announcement period.  Thus, on any 
given day, the third portfolio may contain firms which either announced on that day, the 
preceding or the following day.  However, on some days, very few firms announced, 
resulting in an announcer portfolio of only one or two securities.  For example, of the 
5,464 trading days in the sample period, 211 trading days included none of the three-day 
announcement periods for any of the sample firms.  Moreover, while announcement 
periods overlapped, for an additional 1,014 trading days, the market capitalization of the 
announcing firms comprised less than 0.1 percent of the sample.  Therefore, we construct 
four announcer portfolios: portfolio (1) consists of trading days which include at least one 
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firm’s announcement period; portfolios (2), (3), and (4) consist of trading days where the 
market capitalization of the announcers is at least 0.1 percent, 0.5 percent, and 1.0 
percent of the market capitalization of the sample firms, respectively.  To allow a 
meaningful comparison, all portfolios are value-weighted and 100 percent invested in the 
respective securities.15 
Our results are reported in Table 4.  Column (1) reports the results for all 5,253 
trading days which include a three-day announcement period of at least one announcing 
firm.  Columns (2), (3) and (4) summarize the results for portfolios (2), (3) and (4), 
respectively.  The average combined market capitalization of the announcing firms is 
1.199 percent for the entire sample period.  This figure increases to 1.924 percent for 
portfolio (2), 2.725 percent for portfolio (3) and to 3.512 percent for portfolio (4).   
The first question we analyze is, by how much would an investor with perfect 
foresight of the announcement date reduced his/her portfolio risk by holding a portfolio 
consisting entirely of non-announcers.  The next three rows report the value-weighted 
returns for the entire sample, each of the four announcer portfolios and each of the 
corresponding non-announcer portfolios.  The results indicate that by excluding 
announcing firms, the average daily portfolio returns decline between 3.1 percent (from 
0.097 percent to 0.094 percent) and 3.3 percent (from 0.091 percent to 0.088 percent), 
respectively.  Comparing announcer- and non-announcer portfolios indicates that the 
announcer portfolios’ returns are between 32.95 percent (0.117/0.088 – 1) and 68.09 
percent (0.158/0.094 – 1) higher than the returns of the corresponding non-announcer 
portfolios. 
                                         
15 Notice, however, that the resulting analysis does not correspond to an implementable trading strategy 
because we exclude days on which either no firms announced, or days when less that 0.1, 0.5, or 1 percent 
of the sample firms (by market capitalization) announced 
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Next we analyze portfolio risk.  The results in the next three rows indicate that 
excluding announcers from the entire portfolio reduces the portfolio standard deviation 
between 3 percent (from 0.9371 to 0.9081) and 7.1 percent (from 1.021 to 0.9423).   
While excluding announcers reduces the risk of the entire portfolio, the standard 
deviations of the announcer portfolios is significantly (at the 5 percent level or better) 
larger than the standard deviation of the corresponding non-announcer portfolios.  
However, the differences in risk between announcer- and non-announcer portfolios 
decline as we focus on announcer portfolios on days when a relatively large fraction of 
firms announced.  While holding the announcer portfolio rather than the entire portfolio 
increases the risk by 137.53 percent for all announcers, this increase declines to 39.4 
percent when we focus on the 1,572 trading days when the market capitalization of the 
announcing firms exceeds 1 percent of the market capitalization of the sample.16  In fact, 
the standard deviation of the announcer portfolio is 48.81 percent higher than the 
standard deviation of the entire portfolio when we limit the announcer portfolio to days 
where at least 5 percent of the sample (by market capitalization) announced.  The 
corresponding risk of the non-announcer portfolio is 6.55 percent lower than that of the 
entire portfolio.  Also for this market capitalization, the standard deviation of the 
announcer portfolio is 149 percent of the standard deviation of the entire portfolio, and 
the corresponding risk of the non-announcer portfolio is 93 percent of the standard 
deviation of the entire portfolio. This is surprising, since the risk of the announcer 
portfolio does not seem to converge towards the risk of the non-announcer portfolio (see 
                                         
16 This effect is most likely due to diversification in the announcers portfolios: as indicated above 15.3 
percent (803/5253) of the trading days of announcer portfolio (1) include very few firms (typically one or 
two), resulting in a market capitalization of less than 0.1 percent of the sample (the average market 
capitalization of the announcers portfolio on those 803 trading days is 0.0252 percent of the sample). 
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Figure 1 for a graphical depiction).  Recall that Fama’s 1986 experiment indicates that 
portfolios of approximately 15 securities converge towards the risk of a fully diversified 
portfolio.  
So is the increase in return worth the risk?  To answer this question, we compute the 
Sharpe ratios for the announcer and non-announcer portfolios.  Two results are 
noteworthy.17  First, comparing the non-announcers portfolios to the corresponding entire 
portfolios indicates that the Sharpe ratios always decline when we exclude the 
announcers by between 1.13 percent and 1.55 percent.  Second, the Sharpe ratios of the 
announcer portfolios exceed the Sharpe ratios of the non-announcers portfolios, once 
sufficient diversification is present in the announcer portfolios (portfolios 3 and 4).  This 
indicates that excluding announcers reduces the return-risk tradeoff.  Finally, we compute 
Jensen’s Alpha for the announcer portfolios.18  The results, reported in the last three rows 
of Table 4 indicate that announcer portfolios (2), (3) and (4) earn a significant excess 
return of between 0.038 percent and 0.053 percent per day (significant at the 10 percent 
level for announcer portfolio (2) and at the 5 percent level for announcer portfolios (3) 
and (4)).  Ignoring transactions costs, these daily excess returns correspond to annualized 
excess returns between 10.0 percent and 14.1 percent. 
 The persistence of the above excess returns is puzzling given the assumption that 
markets are efficient.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that documented stock market 
anomalies may exist because arbitrageurs fail to exploit them due to constraints on their 
                                         
17 The Sharpe ratio is defined as the ratio of the portfolio excess return to the portfolio standard deviation, 
i.e., 
)(
)(
P
FP
R
RRPRatioSharpe σ
−= , where  RP, RF and σ(RP) are, respectively, the portfolio return, the risk-
free rate and the standard deviation of the portfolio return.   
18 Jensen’s Alpha is defined as the intercept in a regression of a securities excess return (return minus risk-
free rate) on the market’s excess return. 
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ability to raise risk capital.  They predict that volatility acts as a deterrent and limits 
arbitrage activities resulting in the continuing presence of stock market anomalies.  This 
leads to our next research objective, which is to investigate whether an explanation for 
the existence of the announcement premia anomaly is that limits to arbitrage makes it 
difficult for investors to exploit this anomaly.  
 
7. Limits to Arbitrage and the Persistence of Announcement Risk Premia 
We use five proxies to capture the costs of executing arbitrage transactions for each 
firm j and quarter q: idiosyncratic risk (Div_Riskjq), bid-ask spread (Spreadjq), trading 
volume (Volumejq), float (Floatjq), and the concentration of announcing firms (Weightjq).19 
Following Mashruwala, Rajagopal, and Shevlin (2004), Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 
(2002), and Pontiff (1996) we use the idiosyncratic part of a stock’s volatility to proxy for 
the absence of close substitutes while assuming arbitrage positions.  Idiosyncratic risk is 
relevant to arbitrageurs because arbitrageurs can hold relatively few positions at a time 
due to limited capital. Several papers (e.g., Pontiff 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya 2002; Ali, Hwang and Trombley 2003) that explore 
explanations related to barriers to arbitrage make similar assumptions.  Thus we predict 
that the higher the idiosyncratic risk associated with a firm, the harder it will be for 
arbitrageurs to diversify the risk.  We measure idiosyncratic risk as the residual variance 
from a regression of firm-specific stock returns on the value-weighted CRSP stock index 
for 12 months preceding the quarterly earnings announcement.  
                                         
19 The bid-ask spread, volume and float have been commonly used in the literature as proxies for limits to 
arbitrage, e.g., Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003). 
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 The bid-ask spread (Spreadjq) captures a large portion of the round-trip transactions 
costs.  We measure Spreadjq in the announcement window by computing the average 
daily bid-ask spread scaled by the mid-point of the spread reported by CRSP for each 
firm and quarter.   
 The variable Floatjq measures the number of shares that are available for trading in a 
particular stock.  Depending on the nature of investors and the characteristics of the firm, 
certain stocks may have fewer shares that are actively traded in the market.  Arbitrageurs 
would then be limited in their ability to take positions if there were not enough floating 
stock available for a particular firm.  We measure Floatjq as the average trading volume 
of a firm in each quarter scaled by the average shares outstanding for the firm. 
 The variable Volumejq is a proxy for the impact of arbitrageurs’ taking advantage of 
the premia.  For each firm and quarter, we measure Volumejq as the average of the daily 
trading volume in the earnings announcement window reported by CRSP.  By purchasing 
the stock, arbitrageurs would drive down the premia.  Thus, we expect a negative 
association between Volumejq and the observed announcement-period premia.  Note that 
volume is also a proxy for the arrival of new information (Beaver 1968).  Thus, absent 
arbitrage, volume will be positively correlated with the announcement-period premia if 
volume is indicative of the arrival of new information.    
Our final variable, Weightjq, represents the market capitalization of all firms 
announcing earnings concurrently with firm j.  We include Weightjq as a measure of the 
number of arbitrage positions available on a given day.  Since arbitrage capital is likely to 
be limited, higher values of a Weightjq imply that a given arbitrage capital is spread 
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across more deals, leaving a larger portion of the announcement-period return 
unarbitraged.20 All other variables are as defined before.  
Table 5 reports the correlations among these independent variables for the entire 
sample period (above the main diagonal) and for the 1998-2001 period when we have 
information regarding pre-announcements (below the main diagonal).  The five arbitrage 
variables are significantly correlated in the expected directions, but have fairly low 
correlations with each other. We estimate the following pooled time-series, cross-
sectional regression for both the sample of on-time announcers and of on-time and late 
announcers: 
 
jqjqjqjjq
jqjqjqjqjq
RICkreAnnPhWeightgFloatf
VolumeeSpreaddRiskDivcRMbaAP
ε+×+×+×+×+
×+×+×+×+= _
 (3) 
If limits to arbitrage are a driving force for the observed announcement premium, 
then controlling for the other factors that affect the announcement premium, firms with 
higher values for Div_Riskjq, higher values for Spreadjq, lower values for Volumejq, lower 
values for Floatjq, and  higher values for Weightjq will have higher premiums.  As before, 
we estimate regression (3) using both each firm’s return during its non-announcement 
periods as a control as well as the returns for non-announcers on the announcement days 
as a control.   
The results are reported in Panels A and B of Table 6 (the results for both benchmarks 
are very similar, so we only discuss the results in Panel A and point out differences 
                                         
20 An alternative metric for concentration of announcers could be constructed by counting the total number 
of firms that announced as a percentage of all the sample firms traded on that day (equal-weighted measure 
of clustering).  This metric is frequently used in the literature (Chambers and Penman 1984, Brown, Clinch 
and Foster, 1992).  This equal-weighted metric overemphasizes firms with small capitalizations and hence 
is not representative for investors holding diversified portfolios. 
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whenever they exist).21  Further, we repeat the above analysis by using the 1998-2001 
sub-sample where we have data on pre-announcements of earnings (the pre-
announcement sample). The results corresponding to the total sample are discussed first. 
As expected, Div_Riskjq, has positive and significant coefficient indicating that 
announcement premium is higher for firms with higher idiosyncratic risks.  As expected, 
the coefficient estimate for Spreadjq is positive and significant, indicating that the 
announcement premium is higher for firms with a greater risk of information asymmetry 
and higher trading costs. The coefficients for Volumejq and Floatjq are negative and 
significant, indicating that announcement premium is higher for firms where there is 
usually not a high level of trading among investors holding the stock and when there is 
not enough floating stocks available (the coefficient on Floatjq is not significant for the 
on-time sample when the returns for non-announcers on the announcement days is used 
as a control).  
Consistent with the limits to arbitrage hypothesis, the coefficient on Weightjq is 
positive and significant, indicating (limited) arbitrage capital is not sufficient to exploit 
the premia when there are numerous available arbitrage positions.  Finally, consistent 
with the earlier results, the coefficients on RICjq and RMjq are positive and significant, 
indicating that premia are higher when there the information content of the earnings 
announcements (relative to other sources of information) is high and that earnings 
announcements have a higher β-risk relative to non-announcement days (Ball and 
Kothari, 1991).  
                                         
21 We also estimate regression (3) by replacing RICjq with the variance in the three-day announcement 
period. The results are similar to those obtained on using RICjq.  
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Next, we repeat the analysis for the 1998-2001 subsample where we have information 
on pre-announcements.  The correlations among the variables used for this sample are 
reported in Table 5 below the main diagonal.  As in the previous case, the five arbitrage 
variables are significantly correlated in the expected directions with each other, but the 
magnitudes of the correlations are fairly low.  
The results for the pre-announcement sample reveal that the dummy variable 
PreAnnjq has a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that pre-announcers have a 
lower announcement premium.  The variables Div_Riskjq, Volumejq, Spreadjq and 
Weightjq continue to have the expected signs and are significant at conventional levels in 
explaining the announcement premium. However, the coefficient on Floatjq is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  The coefficient estimates for RICjq and 
RMjq also continue to have positive and significant coefficients. Thus, overall, our 
evidence supports the hypothesis that the continued existence of the announcement 
premium is related to the difficulty that arbitrageurs face in trying to exploit the anomaly.   
As an additional sensitivity test, we re-estimate the regressions in Tables 6A and 6B 
by including size as a control variable (defined as the market value of equity).  Ball and 
Kothari (1991) find that smaller firms have larger announcement premia.  While the 
coefficient of size is negative and significant at the 5% level, inclusion of this variable 
does not materially affect any of our variables of interest. 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
This paper extends the literature which documents that stock returns on earnings 
announcement days are higher than returns on non-announcement days.  We investigate 
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the existence and the magnitude of the announcement premia after controlling for the 
timing of the announcements and the disclosure environment. We also examine whether 
the increased risk on earnings announcement days is justified by the increased return on 
those days. Finally, we investigate whether the limits to arbitrage theory explains the 
continued existence of the earnings announcement premia.  
Our results can be summarized as follows.  First, our analysis establishes the 
existence of an announcement premia even after controlling for the timing of earnings 
announcements (early, on-time or late announcements). However, our evidence also 
suggests that the premia documented in prior research was overstated.  Second, we find 
that the premia are significantly lower for firms that pre-announce earnings and are 
significantly higher for firms with more informative earnings announcements.   Both of 
those results are consistent with the presence of an announcement risk premium. 
Next, we find that a portfolio strategy of excluding announcers from a daily-
rebalanced market portfolio reduces the standard deviation of the portfolio.  However, 
this strategy also reduces the Sharpe ratio, which indicates that excluding announcers 
reduces the return-risk tradeoff.  Moreover, returns on earnings announcement dates 
“earn” significantly positive Jensen’s Alphas, corresponding to an annualized return 
between 10 percent and 14 percent.  Finally, we document that announcement-period 
premia are positively correlated with the costs to arbitrage and the number of available 
arbitrage opportunities.   Jointly, our evidence is consistent with limits to arbitrage being 
one explanation of the continued existence of the premia.   
While prior research has consistently documented a higher return on scheduled 
information release dates, there has not been any direct evidence on whether those higher 
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returns represent announcement-risk premia.  We contribute to this literature by 
providing evidence that the premia are dramatically reduced when the announcement risk 
is reduced through pre-announcements.  Additionally, we provide evidence indicating 
that the continued presence of this premia result from limits to arbitrage.  Jointly, these 
two findings are consistent with the view that the announcement period returns, indeed, 
constitute compensation for bearing announcement risk.   
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Appendix – Analysis and Prediction of Corporate Earnings Announcement Dates 
In this appendix we develop a model of the quarterly earnings announcement dates.  
In practice firms can announce earnings on a particular day of the week or choose the day 
of the week based on the content of news to be disclosed (Watts, 1978; Patell and 
Wolfson, 1982; Penman, 1987; Ball and Bartov, 1995; Brown, Clinch and Foster, 1992).  
Additionally firms may follow complicated algorithms such as “the first Tuesday, three 
weeks following the end of the fiscal quarter,” and it may not be easy to detect those rules 
because actual announcement dates often deviate from expected announcement dates.22   
Various models for prediction of earnings announcement dates have been used in the 
literature.  Givoly and Palmon (1982) use four alternative models to compute the 
expected announcement date.23  In particular, the first model uses a firm’s prior period 
announcement date as a proxy for the current year’s announcement date.  Chambers and 
Penman (1984) and Begley and Fischer (1998) use the same model to analyze quarterly 
as well as annual earnings announcements.24  However, this approach results in 
measurement errors, for any announcement that deviates from the ‘normal’ disclosure 
strategy.  For example, if Qt were to be late, then Qt+4 is likely to be classified as early, 
even when in reality it were announced ‘on time.’  Similar problems are present with the 
other models used in the literature.  Essentially, the use of any expectation model that 
relies on actual announcement dates introduces measurement error to the analysis.   
                                         
22 We thank the referee for pointing this out. 
23 Analysis in Givoly and Palmon (1982) is based on the reporting lag relative to the fiscal year end, rather 
than the reporting date.  However, because the fiscal year end does not vary in their analysis, there is a one-
to-one relation between the expected reporting lag and the expected announcement date. 
24 Chambers and Penman (1984) use two additional models to estimate the expected earnings 
announcement date.   They report that their results were not sensitive to which model they used. 
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To develop the expected announcement date model we analyzed the distribution of 
actual earnings announcement dates.25  First, the distribution of the fourth quarter 
announcement days differs from those of the preceding three fiscal quarters.  While using 
separate models for Q4 and for the other three quarters (Q1, Q2 and Q3) could be 
efficient, the expected announcement dates for the first three fiscal quarters would be 
more precise (by virtue of a larger sample size) and possibly affect some of the 
subsequent analyses.  Therefore, we decided to estimate a separate model (by firm) for 
each of the four fiscal quarters.  Second, there is an upward trend in the announcement 
dates for Q1 through Q3 and an increase in the standard deviation of the Q4 
announcement dates.  To account for these over-time changes in the distribution of the 
announcement dates we divide the 24 year period into six four-year sub-periods.    
For each sample firm and each fiscal quarter, we use the median announcement date 
as the proxy for the expected announcement date.  We select the median because this 
statistic is least likely to be affected by individual deviations for the normal disclosure 
schedule.  For each firm and each quarterly earnings announcement, we compute the 
median announcement date for each four-year sub-period.  Each quarter is divided into 63 
trading days. Using the quarterly earnings-announcement data from COMPUSTAT we 
identify each firm-quarter earnings-announcement date with the day of the quarter (i.e., 
day 1 to day 63).   For each sample firm and each fiscal quarter, we compute the median 
day of announcement (Medjq).   
                                         
25 Detailed results of the analysis are available from the authors and are not reported here in the interest of 
brevity. 
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Using the median as a proxy for the expected announcement date, we compute the 
deviation from the expected announcement day (Devjq) as the absolute difference 
between the actual announcement day and the median announcement day: 
 jqjqjq MedDDev −=  
where for firm j and quarter q, Djq represents the actual announcement day.  Thus, 
Devjq = 0 corresponds to firm j having announced quarter q earnings on the expected day, 
Devjq = 1 represents instances where corporations have announced on either a day earlier 
or a day later than expected, etc.    
Overall, in our sample 39.26 percent of the firm-quarter announcements are on the 
expected announcement day, and 62.22 percent are within one day of the expected date.  
In fact, 86.64 percent of the firm-quarter announcements fall into the 11-day window 
centered on the expected announcement day.  The announcement dates for the first three 
fiscal quarters are more predictable than the announcement dates for the fourth fiscal 
quarter.  For the first three fiscal quarters, the percentages of announcements that are 
released on the expected date range from, 39.90 percent (Q1) to 39.71 percent (Q3), 
while approximately 64 percent are released in the three-day window centered on the 
expected announcement date.  In contrast, only 37.54 percent of Q4 announcements are 
on the expected release date, and 57.14 percent are within one day of the expected release 
date.   
To investigate the sensitivity of our proxy to the length of the estimation period we 
also use four sub-periods (of 6 years each) and one sub-period (of 24 years) to compute 
the expected announcement date and Devjq.  The results indicate a drop of overall on-time 
announcements to 35.03 percent for four sub-periods and to 23.98 percent for one sub-
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period.  The decrease in on-time announcements is most pronounced for Q4.  Thus, the 
percentage of on-time announcements is approximately 36 percent for Q1 through Q3 for 
4 sub-periods and 25.01 percent for one sub-period.  In contrast, for Q4, the frequencies 
are 32.12 percent and 20.39 percent, respectively.  We get similar results (although 
slightly higher on-time announcements) when we use the integral value of the mean 
(rather than the median) as the proxy for the expected announcement date. 
Prior research documents that corporate disclosure practices have changed over time 
with management earnings forecasts and pre-announcements more prevalent in the late 
nineties.  We examine patterns of on-time earnings announcements to verify whether the 
timing of scheduled corporate accounting disclosures has changed over the sample 
period.  The results (not tabulated) indicate a lower frequency of on-time announcements 
(defined as Dev ≤ 1) for Q4 than for Q1 through Q3 (t = 2.23), a negative time trend of 
-0.28 percent per year for all quarters (t = -3.12), and a marginally significant more 
negative time trend for Q4 than that of the other three quarters (incremental slope = -0.18 
percent, t = -1.37).   
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
1978 – 2001 
 Firms Firm Quarters 
Earnings Announcement dates available on COMPUSTAT 12,377 297,426 
Firms with at least 10 quarterly observations 8,493 275,820 
Sample after merging with returns data on CRSP 7,260 227,281 
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TABLE 2   
Announcement-Return Premia Relative to the 
Timing of the Earnings Announcement  
1978-2001 
Expected Announcement 
Date 
Actual Announcement 
Date Portfolio Benchmark 
-1, 0, +1 -1, 0, +1 
Firm 0.05 (2.99) 
0.14 
(11.24) Entire Portfolio 
N = 227,281 Non-
Announcers 
0.01 
(3.11) 
0.06 
(5.48) 
Firm 0.05 (2.49) 
0.29 
(15.18) Early Announcers 
N = 85,912 Non-
Announcers 
-0.00 
(-0.93) 
0.14 
(14.73) 
Firm 0.05 (4.37) 
0.05 
(2.53) On-time and Late Announcers  
N = 141,369 Non-Announcers 
0.01 
(5.14) 
0.01 
(4.20) 
Firm 0.13 (5.49) 
0.13 
(5.49) On-time Announcers  
N = 56,018 Non-Announcers 
0.02 
(2.87) 
0.02 
(2.87) 
Firm -0.00 (-0.31) 
-0.00 
(-0.94) Late Announcers 
N = 85,351 Non-
Announcers 
-0.00 
(0.29) 
-0.00 
(-6.42) 
This table reports the announcement-day returns premia and the associated t-statistics in parenthesis by five 
different types of portfolios. Two benchmarks are used: the return on the firm on non-announcement days 
jj AtjAtj RDRD ∉∈ − ,,  and the return on non-announcing firms on the announcing firm’s announcement date 
tiAtj tj RDRD ,, α∉∈ − .  We compute the premia for the expected announcement window (days -1, 0 and +1). The 
premia are computed for all firm years (Entire Portfolio), for those firms that announce ahead of the expected 
announcement date (Early Announcers), for those firms that announce either on the expected announcement 
date or after the expected dates (On-time and Late Announcers), for those firms that announce on the expected 
announcement date (On-time Announcers), and those firms that are neither early nor on-time announcers (Late 
Announcers). 
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TABLE  3A 
The Relation between Announcement-Return Premia, and Pre-
Announcements 
Row Portfolio 
Benchmark:  Firm’s 
Own Return on 
Non-Announcement 
Dates 
Benchmark:  Non-
announcing Firms’ 
Returns on 
Announcement Dates 
1 
Return on expected announcement 
date for firms that pre-announced  
1998-2001 
0.06    
(2.48) 
0.05    
(2.38) 
2 
Return on expected announcement 
date for firms that did not pre-
announce 1998-2001 
0.14    
(4.08) 
0.11 
 (3.53) 
3 Difference between Rows 1 and 2 -0.08   (-3.54) 
-0.003    
(-2.50) 
4 
Return on expected announcement 
dates in the period 1978-1997 for 
firms that pre-announced in 1998-
2001 
0.54    
(4.57) 
0.14   
(4.02) 
5 
Return on expected announcement 
dates in the period 1978-1997 for 
firms that did not pre-announce in 
1998-2001 
0.56   
(4.96) 
0.16   
 (3.52) 
6 Difference between Rows 4 and 5 -0.02 (-1.41) 
-0.02 
(-1.02) 
This table analyses the relation between the earnings announcement premia, and pre-announcements for the sample 
of on-time and late announcers.  Rows 1 (Row 2) reports the returns for pre-announcing (non-pre-announcing) 
firms on expected announcement dates in the 1998-2001 period.  Row 4 reports the returns on expected 
announcement dates in the 1978-1997 for firms that eventually pre-announced earnings in the 1998-2001 period.  
Row 5 reports the returns on expected announcement dates in the 1978-1997 for firms that did not pre-announce 
earnings in the 1998-2001 period. 
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TABLE  3B 
The Relation between Announcement-Return Premia, Pre-Announcements 
and Informativeness of Earnings 
On-time and Late Announcers 1998 – 2001 
N = 40,224 
jqjqjqjqjq RICdreAnnPcRMbaAP ε+×+×+×+=  
 (1) (2) 
 Benchmark:  Firm’s Own Return 
on Non-Announcement Dates 
Benchmark:  Non-announcing 
Firms’ Returns on Announcement 
Dates 
 Coefficient  
(t-stat) 
Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Constant ×10-3 2.41   (4.81) 
1.13   
(4.01) 
RMjq 
0.877    
(18.42) 
0.713   
 (17.00) 
PreAnnjq ×10-3 
-2.16  
(-5.51) 
-2.98  
(-2.50) 
RICjq×10-2 
7.77    
(23.92) 
6.18   
(15.19) 
F 473.28   (<0.0001) 
206.80   
 (<0.0001) 
R2 0.035 0.026 
This table analyses the relation between the earnings announcement premia, pre-announcements and the 
informativeness of earnings announcements for the sample of on-time and late announcers. For Column (1) the 
dependent variable, APjq, is the return on announcement dates minus the return of the firm on non-announcing 
days; and for Column (2) it is the return on announcement dates minus the return on the same date for non-
announcing firms. The table reports the regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics in parenthesis.   RMjq 
is the value-weighted CRSP return on the market in the announcement period;  PreAnnjq is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm made a pre-announcement in that quarter, and 0 otherwise; RICjq is the sum 
of squared returns in the three-day announcement period divided by the sum of squared returns in the entire 
quarter.    
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TABLE 4 
Analysis of Announcers and Non-announcers Daily Portfolio Returns 
Include trading days with percentage of 
announcers with market capitalization  
(1) 
All 
Announcers (2) at least 0.1 
(3) 
at least 0.5 
(4) 
at least 1.0 
Trading Days 5,253 3,239 2,192 1,572 
Average Market 
Capitalization of 
Announcing firms (%) 
1.199 1.924 2.725 3.512 
Entire 
Portfolio 0.091 0.096 0.097 0.097 
Non-
Announcers 
Portfolio  
0.088 0.093 0.094 0.094 Return (%) 
Announcers 
Portfolio  0.117 0.129 0.132 0.158 
Entire 
Portfolio  0.9371 0.9588 0.9862 1.021 
Non-
announcers 
Portfolio 
0.9081 0.9112 0.9216 0.9423 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Announcers 
Portfolio 2.2259 1.5465 1.4676 1.4233 
Entire 
Portfolio 0.0775 0.0812 0.0797 0.0765 
Non-
announcers 
Portfolio 
0.0763 0.0800 0.0788 0.0755 Sharpe Ratio  
Announcers 
Portfolio 0.0444 0.0714 0.0804 0.0953 
Daily (%) 0.017 0.038 0.042 0.053 
Annualized 
(%) 4.4 10.0 11.2 14.1 
Jensen’s 
Alpha 
Announcers  
t-statistic 0.61 1.84 2.10 2.48 
This table reports results for three value weighted portfolios on days when at least one firm, at least 0.1 
percent, at least 0.5 percent, and at least 1 percent of firms by market capitalization, announced earnings.   
Column (1) reports returns by including the portfolio of announcers independent of the market 
capitalization of the announcing firms.  Columns (2) through (4) report results of excluding announcers 
when the announcers constitute at least 0.1 percent, 0.5, percent, or 1 percent of the market capitalization of 
the sample.  The last three rows report Jensen’s Alpha, the corresponding annualized returns (assuming 250 
trading days per annum) and the associated t-statistics of the announcer portfolio. 
 47
TABLE 5 
Correlation Table 
Total Sample (above the main diagonal) 
Pre-announcement Sample (below the main diagonal) 
 AP1 AP2 RM RIC Weight Div_Risk Spread Volume Float 
AP1  0.927* 0.156* 0.091* 0.013* 0.007 0.022* -0.005 -0.012 
AP2 0.939*  0.126* 0.123* 0.009* 0.021* 0.046* -0.021* 0.005 
RM 0.188* 0.101*  0.004 0.011* 0.013* 0.009 0.004 0.011* 
RIC 0.099* 0.148* 0.017  0.029* -0.089* -0.267* 0.031* 0.022* 
Weight 0.021* 0.013* 0.031* 0.048*  0.129* 0.112* 0.138* 0.041* 
Div_Risk 0.009 0.041* 0.027* -0.097* 0.157*  0.554* -0.071* -0.214* 
Spread 0.029* 0.087* 0.018 -0.328* 0.143* 0.498*  -0.076* -0.143* 
Volume -0.009 -0.041* 0.008 0.064* 0.165* -0.093* -0.091*  0.158* 
Float -0.021 0.007 0.026* 0.042* 0.073* -0.256* -0.178* 0.213*  
*Significant at the 1% level 
This table reports the Pearson correlations of the variables used in the limits to arbitrage tests for the non-pre-
announcement sample. AP1 is the return in the announcement window minus the return on non-announcement dates for 
the same firm; AP2 is the return in the announcement window minus the return of non-announcing firms in the 
announcement window; RM is the value-weighted CRSP return on the market in the announcement period; RIC is the sum 
of squared returns in the three-day announcement period divided by the sum of squared returns in the entire quarter; 
Weight represents the market capitalization of the firms announcing concurrently; Div_Risk  is the diversifiable risk of a 
security measured in the 12 month period prior to a quarter; Spread is the ratio of the high ask price minus the low bid 
price divided by the average of the high ask price and the low bid price; Volume is the average trading volume during the 
announcement period; Float is the average trade volume during quarter (excluding announcement window) divided by 
total number of shares outstanding.  
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TABLE 6 – PANEL A 
Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage 
Premium measured on the three-day announcement period 
Benchmark: Firm’s Returns on Non-Announcement Days 
jqjqjqjjq
jqjqjqjqjq
RICkeAnnrPhWeightgFloatf
VolumeeSpreaddRiskDivcRMbaAP
ε+×+×+×+×+
×+×+×+×+= _
 
 Total Sample 1978-2001 N = 141,369 
Pre-announcement Sample  
1998-2001 
N=40,224 
  Coeff.   (t-stat)  Coeff.    (t-stat) 
Constant × 10-3  2.14    (4.25)  3.07   (2.58) 
RMjq × 10-1  7.71    (62.49)  6.99    (27.33) 
Div_Riskjq ×10-4  5.75    (4.78)  1.14    (3.89) 
Spreadjq×10-3  7.47    (4.06)  2.23    (5.37) 
Volumejq×10-10  -2.81    (-2.42)  -4.23    (-3.33) 
Floatjq×10-5  -5.04    (-4.19)  -5.03    (-0.56) 
Weightjq × 10-2  6.57    (3.54)  2.93    (4.62) 
PreAnnjq × 10-3 NA  -1.41    (-3.01) 
RICjq × 10-2  9.97    (47.42)  7.13    (25.63) 
F   (p-value)  909.12    (<0.0001)  297.96  (<0.0001) 
R2 × 10-2 4.29 3.89 
This table analyses whether limits to arbitrage arguments are a potential explanation for the existence of the announcement 
premia for the sample of on-time announcers as well as on-time and late announcers. The dependent variable, APjq, is the 
return on announcement dates minus the return on non-announcement dates for the same firm. The table reports the 
regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics in parenthesis.  RMjq is the value-weighted CRSP return on the market 
in the announcement period; Div_Riskjq is the diversifiable risk of security j measured in the 12 month period prior to 
quarter q; Spreadjq is the ratio of the high ask price minus the low bid price divided by the average of the high ask price and 
the low bid price; Volumejq is the average trading volume during the announcement period; Floatjq is the average trade 
volume during quarter (excluding announcement window) divided by total number of shares outstanding; Weightjq 
represents the market capitalization of the firms announcing concurrently with firm j; PreAnnjq is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if the firm made a pre-announcement in that quarter, and 0 otherwise;  RICjq is the sum of squared 
returns in the three-day announcement period divided by the sum of squared returns in the entire quarter.  
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 TABLE 6 – PANEL B 
Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage 
Premium measured on the three-day announcement period 
Benchmark: Returns of Non-Announcing Firms in Announcement Window 
jqjqjqjjq
jqjqjqjqjq
RICkeAnnrPhWeightgFloatf
VolumeeSpreaddRiskDivcRMbaAP
ε+×+×+×+×+
×+×+×+×+= _
 
 Total Sample 1978-2001 N =  141,369  
Pre-announcement Sample  
N=40,224 1998-2001 
  Coeff.    (t-stat)  Coeff.    (t-stat) 
Constant × 10-3  1.00    (1.12)  1.12    (1.42) 
RMjq × 10-1  8.94    (36.54)  7.71    (29.41) 
Div_Riskjq ×10-4  2.35    (4.20)  1.93    (2.67) 
Spreadjq×10-3  2.34    (1.76)  2.11    (5.09) 
Volumejq×10-10  -4.54    (-1.97)  -6.10    (-4.88) 
Floatjq×10-5  -1.15    (-4.81)  -1.65    (-0.49) 
Weightjq × 10-2  2.35    (4.20)  3.17    (5.07) 
PreAnnjq × 10-3 NA  -2.60    (-5.64) 
RICjq × 10-2  6.91    (29.67)  6.64    (24.24) 
F (p-value)  487.21    (<0.0001)  201.61 (<0.0001) 
R2 × 10-2 2.97 3.84 
This table analyses whether limits to arbitrage arguments are a potential explanation for the existence of the announcement 
premia for the sample of on-time announcers as well as on-time and late announcers. The dependent variable, APjq, is the return 
on announcement window minus the return of non-announcing firms on that announcement window. The table reports the 
regression coefficients and the associated t-statistics in parenthesis. RMjq is the value-weighted CRSP return on the market in the 
announcement period;  Div_Riskjq is the diversifiable risk of security j measured in the 12 month period prior to quarter q;  
Spreadjq is the ratio of the high ask price minus the low bid price divided by the average of the high ask price and the low bid 
price; Volumejq is the average trading volume during the announcement period; Floatjq is the average trade volume during 
quarter (excluding announcement window) divided by total number of shares outstanding; Weightjq represents the market 
capitalization of the firms announcing concurrently with firm j; PreAnnjq is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
firm made a pre-announcement in that quarter, and 0 otherwise; RICjq is the sum of squared returns in the three-day 
announcement period divided by the sum of squared returns in the entire quarter.  
